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Intelligence, 2 
With the dawning of the computer age in the early 1950's, researchers realized that 
computers were able to do more than mathematics. By 1955, Allen Newell and Herbert Simon 
were arguing that computers could instantiate the same functions as intelligent beings and 
Artificial Intelligence was born. AI embraces the Physical Symbol System hypothesis of 
intelligence, frrst formulated by Newell and Simon: 
The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis. A physical symbol system has the 
necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action. 
By 'necessary' we mean that any system that exhibits general intelligence will 
prove upon analysis to be a physical symbol system. By 'sufficient' we mean that any 
physical symbol system of sufficient size can be organized further to exhibit general 
intelligence (Newell & Simon, 1981, p. 41). 
There are two assumptions which are essential to this hypothesis: the frrst is that intelligence is 
a matter of performance, or functional intelligence, and the second is that mental representations 
can be encoded as the symbols of computational machines. This hypothesis represents the 
position of the Symbolic approach to AI. 
More recently, debates in AI have focused on the implications of Connectionism. 
Connectionism is the hypothesis that distributed computations are capable of instantiating 
intelligent functions without relying on the representational character of symbols, but rather on 
the computational states themselves which are cal1~ distributed representations (Haugeland, 
1991). This distinction puts connectionism at odds with symbolic theory. The current debates 
tend to be over which theory will yield intelligent systems--symbolic or connectionist? But as we 
will soon see, this really amounts to a debate over which representational scheme is required for 
general intelligence. 
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In this paper, I examine just what claims are required for the symbolic and connectionist 
hyPOtheses, and whether these claims are valid. I begin by examining the claim that general 
intelligence is essentially intelligent behavior--the claim of functionalism. I find that functional 
intelligence is an insufficient condition for general intelligence, which means being truly 
intelligent requires more than the ability to pass a Turing test. Both connectionist and symbolic 
theories argue that they can achieve genuine intelligence if they introduce the appropriate 
representations in their systems. I therefore examine the prospects of the two representational 
schemes--whether symbolic or distributed representations can provide sufficient conditions for 
general intelligence. I argue that neither representational scheme can be sufficient for 
intelligence. This implies that neither approach will yield genuinely intelligent systems. I 
conclude with a discussion of what symbolic and connectionist research is capable of achieving 
in light of my arguments. While AI, as traditionally conceived, cannot fulfJll its goal of 
" 
artificially creating intelligent systems, it can still do meaningful research. AI can very 
successfully model certain aspects of cognitive functions. 
I. Functionalism 
The most widely held paradigm in contemporary psychology is functionalism. Paul 
Churchland in his book Matter and Consciousness provides a clear definition of functionalism: 
According to functionalism, the essential or defining feature of any type of mental state 
is the set of causal relations it bears to (1) environmental effects on the body, (2) other 
types of mental states, and (3) bodily behavior. Pain, for example, characteristically 
results from some bodily damage or trauma; it causes distress, annoyance, and practical 
reasoning aimed at relief; and it causes wincing, blanching, and nursing of the traumatized 
area. Any state that plays exactly that functional role is a pain, according to 
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functionalism. Similarly, other types of mental states (sensations, fears, beliefs, and so 
on) are also defined by their unique causal roles in a complex economy of internal states 
mediating sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. 
This view may remind the reader of behaviorism, and indeed it is the heir to 
behaviorism, but th~re is one fundamental difference between the two theories. Where 
the behaviorist hoped to define each type of mental state solely in terms of environmental 
input and behavioiaI. output, the functionalist denies that this is possible. As he sees it, 
the adequate characterization ofalmost any mental state involves an ineliminable reference 
to a variety of other mental states with which it is causally connected, and so a reductive 
definition solely in terms of publicly observable inputs and outputs is quite impossible. 
Functionalism is therefore immune to one of the main objections against behaviorism 
(Churchland, 1984, p. 36) 
So psychofunctionalism' is essentially an extended version ofbehaviorism that allows us to appeal 
to causal relations between different mental states in addition to causal relations between behavior 
and the environment. This would seem to avoid the problems of behaviorism's much narrower 
ontology; it would also seem to allow us to describe such mental processes which go into 
behavior formation as perceiving, interpreting, reasoning, deciding, and remembering. But 
functionalism will. still be inadequate for describing at least one aspect of mental states necessary 
for intelligence--what they mean. 
For the purposes of this paper I take psychofunctionalism to be the view that intelligence 
can be equated with or reduced to functions or functional states--that being intelligent is behaving 
intelligently. I argue that functionalism as a theory for intelligence is incomplete in that it fails 
to account for at least one important aspect of intelligence--the meaning ofbeliefs. This argument 
'1 shall use the term psychofunctionalism throughout this paper to refer to the theory of 
functionalism as a complete psychological theory as just defined by Churchland. This will be 
helpful in distinguishing it later from less ambitious doctrines which seek to provide a functional 
analysis or description of mental events without trying to provide a functional reduction of 
mental events. 
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rests on an assumption that I take as being generally uncontroversial. This assumption is that a 
necessary condition for intelligence is that behavior is essentially meaningful and that intelligent 
beings can access the meaning of at least some of their beliefs. Laurence Bonjour (1991) defends 
this assumption in his "Is Thought a Symbolic Process" and I take his to be a convincing if 
unnecessary demonstration. 
Given this assumption, I hope to show that psychofunctionalism is incapable of explaining 
the meaning inherent in our beliefs. The reason it cannot is that it cannot distinguish between 
those functions that are meaningful and those that are meaningless to a system. This argument 
rests on my showing that the only two options for a psychofunctional account of intentional 
semantics is to appeal to the causes of beliefs or the behavioral consequences of beliefs, and that 
both of these options leave intentional meaning indeterminant. The reason for this is that 
psychofunctionalism cannot determine which functions from causes to behaviors are intelligent 
and which are not, or which are realized and which are not. The result is that on this view all 
functions are equally intelligent. Calculators and thermostats, as functional systems, behave in 
the ways that they do based on their intentions just as much as humans act the way they do based 
on their intentions. This is just to say that thermostats can achieve intelligence and have beliefs 
if being intelligent just means functioning in the appropriate ways. 2 If my arguments here are 
sound, the result will be that psychofunctionalism cannot account for the fact that our thoughts 
2The alternative conclusion might be eliminative functionalism, whereby humans don't have 
beliefs at all. But I find this to be unpalatable and uninteresting as well as counter to my 
assumption that we do have internally accessible beliefs. 
•
 
Intelligence, 6 
are meaningful, and hence functional intelligence is an insufficient condition for general 
intelligence. 
u. Functionalism and Intentional Indeterminacy 
In trying to express his concern that philosophy of the mind is not addressing the issues 
revolving around consciousness, John Searle presents the problem of meaning in 
psychofunctionalism (Searle, 1990). Basically, psychofunctionalism cannot precisely fIx the 
meaning of mental states--more specifIcally the subjective meaning that a belief has for the 
believer. Searle's despair is that this has led to the general avoidance of the consciousness 
"problem" and thus his argument is presented in terms of consciousness. Searle seems to think 
that by turning certain brain states into conscious states, we will easily and decisively explain 
mental phenomena. I think his conclusions are mistaken but fInd interesting implications to be 
drawn from his arguments. I have thus adapted his lucid discussion for my own purposes. 
However much of the argument remains his, I doubt he would endorse my ultimate conclusions. 
My concerns in this portion of paper are to illuminate the failed attempts of functionalism at 
explaining thought contents or meanings, while Searle is concerned with explaining subjective 
conscious experience. 
Searle reminds us that in explaining any phenomenon, we need to address three aspects 
of it: its ontology, causality, and epistemology. The fundamental problem that strict behaviorism 
ran into was a confusion between ontology and epistemology (Searle, 1990). Noting that the only 
objective, empirical method for investigating human thought is to study the overt behaviors of 
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people, the behaviorists quickly turned to explaining thought in strictly behavioral terms. They 
took what was an epistemological constraint and turned it into a metaphysical conclusion about 
the mind. According to behaviorism, mentality is nothing more than behavior and dispositions 
to behave in certain ways. 
Functionalism is guilty of making the other possible mistake: confusing causation and 
ontology. By observing that the universe-according-to-physics is nothing but a complex 
interaction of causal sequences, the functionalists concluded that so too must mental events be 
actors in the causal play. So minds have inputs, such as sense experience, and outputs, such as 
behavior, and mental states that can influence other mental states. Including mental states allows 
psychology to include beliefs and desires in the story of what goes on between the inputs and 
outputs. On this construal, mentality is nothing more than having the proper causal relations 
between inputs, outputs and mental states. This is to say that there is nothing more to a thought 
or idea than its causal significance or functional role. 
I think both of these confusions result from scientific sympathies to the assumptions of 
physicalism. Physicalism would have us believe that our ontology contains only one category 
(the physical) and we can thus ignore or assume this phenomenal aspect for all phenomena. 
•
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There is thus a faith in the sciences that we can understand all phenomena in physicalist terms. 3 
In trying to be accepted as a genuine science, psychology has largely adopted this physicalism. 
Public opinion and ever adYancing research in psychology have consumed many scientists and 
philosophers in the chore of trying to jury-rig physicalism's mental ontology to fit with 
psychological theory and hence physicalism. 
Psychofunctionalism is appealing to the physicalist because it is a way of describing 
psychological phenomena or descriptions as supervening4over physical descriptions. A functional 
description avoids the problems of physical descriptions in identifying meaning with specific 
physical states by identifying meanings with functional states. This amounts to saying that certain 
physical states alone are not sufficiently meaningful, but a physical state properly "hooked-up" 
in a larger system can be meaningful. This is achieved by the grace of functional equivalence. 
Functional equivalence is the idea that it does not matter how we physically instantiate a function; 
as long as the function is the same the meaning is the same. 6 
3Interestingly (and perhaps fittingly) enough, it is probably the theoretical mathematicians and 
physicists who are the most likely scientific group to disbelieve logic and physicalism 
respectively. Fuzzy logic is trying to solve the paradoxes created by formal logic and set theory 
while particle physics has demonstrated that electrons and photons have indefinite ontological 
status. Electrons are subject to the Uncertainty Principle while photons can be waves or particles 
but not both at the same time. Physicalism may be in vogue, but it doesn't necessarily match all 
of the empirical evidence available and is not embraced by all physical scientists. 
4Supervenience is a notion by which we can give generalized functional descriptions 
independent of precise physical descriptions without having to appeal to ontologically distinct 
entities such as minds. 
6If the function is, for example, the addition function of arithmetic, it doesn't matter if we 
carry it out on our fingers, an abacus, a calculator, a supercomputer or the human brain if we 
get the same outputs for the same inputs, then the functions instantiated are the same. Artificial 
Intelligence, 9 
Some functionalists contend that some properties of mental states such as meaning simply 
supervene upon functional states. There are many versions of supervenience, but I think it is safe 
to say that all of them ultim~tely say that meaning is something that is causally divorced from the 
functional process. Meaning has no· causal efficacy and hence is epiphenomenal. Many 
functionalist theories, however, wish to maintain that beliefs and intentions affect our behavior 
in the ways that they do as a consequence of their meaning, and it is this sort of functionalism 
that is important to the Physical System Hypothesis and which I wish to address. 
Searle draws a very useful distinction between intrinsic intentionality and as-if 
intentionality. II As-if intentionality is just the sort of intentionality that you can ascribe to 
anything whatsoever. Anything's behavior can be explained as if it were a conscious thinking 
thing. As Searle demonstrates: 
Water flowing downhill behaves as if it had intentionality. It tries to get to the bottom 
of the hill by ingeniously seeking the line of least resistance, it does i1iformation 
processing in order to calculate the size of the rocks, the angle of the slope, the pull of 
gravity, etc. (Searle, 1990, p. 274). 
If you are at all uncomfortable with saying that everything in the world is thinking about what 
it is doing, and you should be, then there needs to be a kind of intentionality that only truly 
Intelligence is founded on the notion that we can design computers to carry out those functions 
which make humans intelligent and strong AI theorists argue that such a computer can then be 
said to have intelligence in virtue of its capability to perform those functions. 
IIphilosophers like to talk about minds in terms of intentionality. An intention is just the 
believing in or desiring for a particular state of affairs in the world. This generally takes the 
form of asserting or believing some mental proposition. Having intentionality just means having 
genuine beliefs or desires. See Searle (1983) for a thorough study of intentionality. 
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mental things can have, namely intrinsic intentionality. Tied up in this notion of intrinsic 
intentionality are our deepest notions of what mentality is. Thought is essentially meaningful 
and this meaning potentially. plays a role in conscious experience. We call something intrinsically 
intentional only if it has the capacity td entertain and understand genuine ideas which is to say 
it has some sort of colorful mental life. 
The inability of functionalism to capture the subjective aspects of thought has been 
discussed at length in the literature regarding qualia. The idea here is that there are qualitative 
mental experiences such as color sensations that are essentially subjective, and private. Since we 
can never experience someone else's sensory qualia, we can never know what someone else's 
quaIia are like nor can we be justified in saying what has them and what does not. The 
functionalist's short answer to this problem is to regard such subjective experiences as non­
essential, epiphenomenal, or altogether non-existent. If there were properties inherent to a 
thought that cannot be realized in the functional roles of that state, then those properties aren't 
a part of the explanation of why that thought has the consequences it does. Since there are no 
objective phenomena, and the subjective phenomena do not seem to be required to explain 
anything objectively relevant, qualia just do not matter to science (perhaps it is an aesthetic 
issue). 
I believe that this problem extends itself beyond the qualia issue to the content issue. 
While it may not be necessary to an account of the mind to specify what our thoughts "feel" like, 
it will certainly be necessary to specify what those thoughts mean. The fact that we can 
understand anything, that we can formulate a philosophical theory and even functionalism, implies 
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that our thoughts have meaning such that we can access and understand them. It turns out that 
meaning is actually paramount to a pretheoretical notion of psychology. Almost all psychological 
theory, and especially functional psychology, is based on the notion that our behaviors are based 
upon our beliefs and more specifically that we frequently behave the way we do based upon 
what our thoughts mean. So, unlike qualia which may not need to be part of the psychological 
story, content and meaning are absolutely essential for an understanding of the mind-brain and 
human history in general. But as Searle points out, meaning is just as subjective and externally 
inaccessible as qualia. 
Searle describes thoughts as having a particular aspectual shape. The aspectual shape is 
the precise meaning one has in mind when one entertains a thought. For example, Searle 
entertains a desire for a glass of water but does not entertain the desire for a glass of H20. These 
intentions are coreferential yet differ in their mode of reference or aspect; we can imagine 
someone who does not know that water is H20 and would not agree in the equivalence of these 
beliefs. Searle is clear that "This aspectual feature must matter to the agent. It must exist from 
his/her point of view" (Searle, 1990, p. 275). This is really just another way of talking about 
the referential opacity of intentions and narrow content.7 This is to say that there is meaning to 
7The semantic opacity of thoughts is simply the idea that we can understand the meaning of 
the thoughts in our head in a specific way even though there are aspects of their meaning which 
we do not necessarily understand. The fact that we can believe something about the Evening Star 
but not believe the same thing about the Morning Star is an example of this opacity. This is 
because we might not be aware of the fact that the Morning Star is really the same thing as the 
Evening Star. Narrow content is the specific content of a given belief. By specific, I mean the 
content of a belief that can be about the Evening Star and not the Morning Star. 
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a belief which has efficacy in the reasoning processes of the subject. There may be many other 
meanings that a belief could have, but there is at least one which the subject actually does have, 
and this is the one that determines behavior. 
The consequence' psychofunctionalism's inability to describe subjective intentional 
ascriptions is that it results in intentional indeterminacy. The fact that psychofunctionalism 
results in intentional indeterminacy is due to the methods of functional analysis. There are many 
equally accurate levels of objective functional description for any complex functional system. A 
functional description of the kidneys could describe their role in any of a number of different 
bodily systems (the circulatory, excretory, or endocrine). In describing the functional role of a 
process or mental state, it becomes necessary to define the scope of the system for which the role 
of the function will be determined. A linear transformation algorithm in computer science is a 
well defined function, but this same algorithm will have a different functional role when it is 
considered as part of a ray-tracing program then it will in a multi-variable statistics program. 
How one defmes the system determines in part what the functional role will be; part of defining 
the system includes division into subsystems, the situational context which the system or 
subsystem is in, and the purposes we have in seeking the function. Because we can analyze a 
system for different purposes, we can generate equally valid functional roles for the same process 
or state. The indeterminacy that results from functional role analyses will give us a great many, 
if not potentially infinite, number of possible 'meanings' for a given state. 
The basic tenet of psychofunctionalism being that everything is part of a causal chain with 
beliefs being steps in some causal chains linking stimuli to behaviors, it becomes very important 
Intelligence, 13 
we "cut-up" the causal chains for our descriptions of beliefs. Fred Dretske, an advocate of 
functionalist cause, describes the difficulty in this process: 
One can be easily misled into thinking that the cause of a behavior is necessarily the cause 
of output. And opce this confusion is in place, one will have no option but to identify 
causal explanations of why we do the things we do with causal explanations of why our 
body moves the way it does. One will, in other words, have succeeded in confusing 
psychologicalexplanations ofbehavior with neurobiological explanations ofmotor activity. 
Reasons--our thinking this and wanting that--will have been robbed of an explanatory 
job to do, reasons--and by this I mean the beliefs, desires, intentions, and purposes that 
common sense recognizes as reasons--will have been robbed of any scientifically reputable 
basis for existing...Thinking about behavior as a process having output as its product, is, 
if nothing else, a useful way of avoiding this mistake (Dretske, 1988, p. 36). 
Dretske is really doing two things here. The first is setting up a distinction between intended 
behavior and actual response output which he uses as a starting point for his covariance theory 
of meaning. The second is to set up a supervenience of functional belief descriptions over causal 
sequences. I will address covariance theories of meaning in the next section, so I am only 
concerned here with his second objective which is the embedded nature of intentions and causes. 
The supervenience of beliefs as functions involved in causal chains is quite important to 
us because it matters a great deal what we pick out as the intention in a causal chain of events. 
This is due to the fact that the causal chains of the world stretch all the way back to the Big Bang 
and forward to seeming eternity, as well as intertwine and overlap one another, while our 
intentions are temporally limited and singular. Humans are limited beings and a human intention 
is generally aimed at bringing about a panicular state of affairs or having a panicular 
consequence. The indeterminacy of psychofunctionalism stems from our inability to determine 
precisely which functional analysis will give us the particular intention that an individual has. 
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Let's take Dretske's own example to clarify what I mean: 
Suppose Clyde accidentally knocks his wine glass over in reaching for the salt. The glass 
falls to the carpet, breaks, and leaves an ugly red stain. Clyde has done a number of 
things: moved his arm, knocked over the wine glass, broken it, spilled the wine, and 
ruined the carpet. ,He did all these things--the first intentionally, the others inadvertently. 
In speaking of these as things Clyde did, we locate the cause of these various events and 
conditions in Clyde. In each case the effect is different--arm movement, the glass toppling 
over, its breaking, the wine's spilling, and the carpet's being stained--and hence the 
behavior, the process having these different events or conditions as its product, is 
different. But the causal origin, some event or condition in Clyde, is the same (Dretske, 
1988, p. 37). 
Dretske tells us that Clyde intended only to move his arm while the other events were unintended. 
This clearly seems to be the case, but how is the psychofunctionalist to determine precisely what 
Clyde meant to do when he moved his arm, what he actually intended? Perhaps an appeal to 
previous cases in Clyde's causal history such as Clyde's desire for salt or the fact that the salt 
was behind the wine glass could more strictly determine his beliefs in this case, but the next case 
will show that it will often be impossible to determine one's intentions based on causal features. 
Suppose you· are playing a game of chess with me. We have established a small wager 
and you have no idea how good I am at chess. The game is going quite well when I make what 
you find to be an absurd move with my King's Knight: I expose myself to a checkmate in two 
moves. Now you get wary and try to figure out my intentions based upon the function of this 
move. First you may think I made a mistake: I intended to threaten your Queen and failed to 
see that I had opened myself up to a checkmate. Then you may come to believe that such an 
obvious flaw must be a trick, and you begin looking for the ways in which I might be trying to 
get the better of you. A narrow view of my intentions will yield my intention to make a 
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particular move. But chess is a game of strategy, and a particular move is generally part of a 
broader strategy which I have in mind, the broadest being that I intend to win the game. But 
perhaps I am a sort of chess, hustler, and I am intending to throw this game in the hope of getting 
you to wager double on the next game; so there is a chance that I do not have even the broad 
intention to win. A mid-level analysis might be that I am simply trying to execute some gambit 
that you have never seen. Which analysis of my move is the correct one? I argue that there is 
no way for a functional account of the chess game to determine what my intention is because each 
level of analysis is equally plausible in describing the causal events, but I only have one set of 
intentions. 
The psychofunctionalist's first response is probably going to be that I have multiple, 
overlapping, or embedded intentions when I move my piece. It will probably go something like: 
I intend to win the game, I believe that my avant-garde gambit will win me the game, I believe 
that moving my King's Knight will result in an execution of my gambit, and so I intend to move 
my Knight in order to satisfy all of these intentions. My intentions are many, but my behavior 
is singular. The issue at hand is how to precisely determine all and only those intentions I have 
in moving my Knight by means of a purely causal account of the situation. It may be the case 
that I am a novice, my earlier moves were beginner's luck, and this move was capricious; I only 
intended to move my Knight and hoped it would help me to win. The psychofunctionalist will 
have to appeal to my previous chess experience to judge how much I might know about the game, 
but even this cannot conceivably be sufficient to determine my intentions, so long as the game 
situation is sufficiently novel to me. Even if I am a grandmaster, I could be trying a newly 
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devised gambit or have overlooked a piece. 
There is, in fact, a much deeper issue lurking here. Even if my intention were merely 
to move my Knight, what does this intention mean? Without the situational rules surrounding 
the game of chess, the movement of chess pieces is meaningless. 8 Given the goals and rules of 
the game, a particular move has significance, or a role in the overall game. Given that this 
game is part of a social interchange between you and me, it is also subject to the rules ofpersonal 
protocol, and the laws of the city, state, and country we are playing in.e A large part of 
determining my intentions is going to involve determining my understanding and awareness of 
the rules of the game. It seems that I might intend many different things by my move, but I 
surely do not intend every thing it signifies. Dretske mentions this in his book Knowledge and 
the Flow of Information: 
It makes little sense... to speak of the informational content of a signal as though this was 
unique. Generally speaking, a signal carries a great variety of different informational 
contents, a great variety of different pieces of information, and although these pieces of 
information may be related to each other (e.g., logically), they are nonetheless different 
8physical acts which are given meaning by their role in defmed systems such as games or 
laws, ruled-governed acts, are called Conventional Acts. There is a sizable literature on 
Conventional Acts and Speech Acts which has implications for belief and linguistic content which 
I do not have the space to address in this paper. See Searle (1969) for more on these 
implications. 
elf you happen to be my boss or superior, or have a bad temper, it may be part of the rules 
of social protocol for me to throw the game. It may also be a subtle slight against you to throw 
the game in an obvious manner in order to indicate that I am deliberately losing. Because we 
have placed a wager on the game, all of my intentions regarding the game may rightly qualify 
as "illegal" according to the gambling laws of the state we are playing in. Do I thereby intend 
to commit a misdemeanor by moving my Knight? We could probably go on and analyze this 
game's significance in politics, economics, or world history, but the point is that it matters a great 
deal where we draw the line as to what my move signifies or represents. 
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pieces of information... This feature of information serves to distinguish it sharply from 
the concept of meaning--at least the concept of meaning relevant to semantic studies of 
language and belief. The statement "Joe is at home" may be said to mean that Joe is at 
home (whatever the person who made it happened to mean or intend by making it). It 
certainly does not Il\ean that Joe is either at home or at the office. The statement implies 
that Joe is either at home or at the office, but this is not what it means. On the other 
hand, if the statement carries the-information that Joe is at home, it carries the information 
that Joe is either at home or at the office. It cannot communicate the one piece of 
information without communicating the other. One piece of information is analytically 
nested in the other (Dretske, 1981, p. 72). 
If we look closely at what Dretske is telling us, it is that there are many implications or 
significances to any behavior. What a behavior, especially a linguistic behavior, signifies is not 
what it means. What it means depends on what it was intended to mean. What we can figure 
out empirically (maybe) is what a behavior signifies. What the functionalist is claiming is that 
these empirical methods can give us the intention behind the behavior. But a determination of 
what my intention is requires an understanding of what my move means and, ala Quine, this 
cannot be had without first knowing what my intention was--a clearly circular conception of 
intentional content. 
The indeterminacy of intentions rests on the inability to determine which level of analysis 
will give us the intentions that an individual is using as a basis for his/her actions. This has led 
to a philosophical notion termed narrow content. Narrow content is opposed to wide content. '0 
Wide content is a notion put forth by Hilary Putnam (1975) according to which there is an aspect 
of meaning to our thoughts to which we do not have access. Roughly, intending to buy a lottery 
'ontese terms are roughly equivalent to the opaque and transparent construals of meaning 
discussed earlier. Wide content is content transparently construed while narrow content is content 
opaquely or nontransparently construed. 
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ticket is usually the intention to buy a winning lottery ticket, but there is no way of knowing 
which you are actually buying so you can't be sure which kind you intended to buy in the wide 
sense--it depends on actual ~tates of the world which you don't have access to (at least until after 
you've bought the ticket). Narrow content is the aspect of intentional meaning to which we 
necessarily have access; indeed it is the aspect which is argued to determine behavior (Fodor, 
1981). According to this construal (or scope) of content, it can be your intention to shoot "the 
deer" even though "the deer" turns out to be your hunting companion, Bob. The fact that "the 
deer" is your friend doesn't affect the fact that you thought it was venison. 
This amounts to a demonstration that there are different ways to ascribe meaning to mental 
states functionally. This motivates Fodor to argue that it is only the narrow construal that should 
be utilized in psychology. But there are also different ways to identify narrow content, and it 
turns out that we cannot strictly determine even the narrow contents, much less intentionality. 
As Robert Stalnaker (1990) puts it: 
Even if we could individuate thought or beliefs independently of their contents, this would 
not necessarily suffice to yield a determinate narrow content for them by the procedure 
I have suggested [which is considering contents for other possible worlds]. Suppose we 
identify mental thought tokens by their physical or syntactic properties. These properties 
surely will not be sufficient to determine even the narrow content of the thought token 
(Stalnaker, 1990, p. 135). 
Stalnaker goes on to argue that to limit the causal relations of thoughts to "in-the-head" functional 
relations, as narrow content seems to require, will result not in a narrow content but in no 
content whatsoever. Stalnaker is an advocate of externalism and his argument claims that the 
thoughts in our head ultimately depend on the outside world for their meaning. I will discuss 
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the different approaches of internalism and externalism in the section on representation. 
The problem for narrow content is ultimately one ofperspective; when trying to determine 
someone's narrow intentional state, different perspectives will yield different intentions. Ned 
Block (1991) points in the direction of this problem with the following example: 
If you and I both say "My pants are now on fire," we express contents (truth conditions) 
that are importantly different. What you say is true just in case your pants are on fire; 
what I say is true just in case my pants are on fire. Nonetheless, there is also an 
important semantic commonality (Block, 1991, p. 34). 
Block goes on to distinguish the character of a thought from its content, where the character is 
the functional role of the thought and the content is the actual subjective meaning of the thought. 
Thus, it is really the narrow character which gets involved in behavior: 
Character is relevant to psychological explanation in a way that content is not. Suppose 
you and I think thoughts with the same character, thoughts that we both would express 
with "My pants are on fire," and as a result, we jump into a nearby pool. The common 
character of our thoughts would seem to be part of the explanation of the commonality 
of our behaviors. By contrast, if we both had thoughts with the same content, the content 
that I express with "My pants are on fire," we would have done quite different things: 
I jump in the pool, but you don't jump--you push me in (Block, 1991, p. 34). 
Block is arguing that it is the character that can be determined by psychologically objective 
observations, not the content that the subject has. 
This goes back to Searle's arguments about an objective science of subjective experience. 
Quite simply, we are only inclined to call these thoughts similar from an external, objective 
perspective--it is the thought's character which is easily generalizable. The functionalist would 
say that the thoughts are similar because they result in similar behaviors. But subjectively, I 
think about myself in very different ways than you think about yourself. Thus, our thoughts are 
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importantly different in content. The problem of perspective with regards to narrow content is 
that a narrow determination of content will have to be in terms which are defined only for the 
system under scrutiny. While it is conceptually possible to derive the necessary terms in a 
holistic fashion, these terms will be meaningless when we consider the system objectively--we 
cannot use these terms to describe any other system. Thus, even narrow content, which is 
supposed to be the subject's content, is underdetermined by functional analysis. 
Block examines the consequences of choosing either perspective for psychology. He 
argues that there are only two possible routes for narrow content (he doesn't question his 
functionalist presuppositions). On the first account, narrow content is a matter of the thought's 
function in a given situation and content collapses into the syntax for that situation. On the other 
hand, narrow content can include the content of all the employed terms as they are used in the 
system in general. On this account, we end up with holistic semantics. But according to holistic 
semantics, every individual will have slightly different understandings of their proper name terms 
giving different subjective meanings to all thoughts to such a degree that no one is ever thinking 
the same thing as someone else or even at two different times. Block argues that this is an 
unfortunate result, but necessary if we want to get at true subjective content. 
Besides the infelicitous result that nobody ever has the same belief as anyone else (nor can 
we account for belief similarities between individuals), there are deep problems for a holistic 
semantics. First, there is no reason to think that anyone's holistic semantic "map" will be 
complete or self-consistent. Indeed, it seems that we very often have inconsistent beliefs about 
something, yet these beliefs are still contentful, and holism cannot account for this. Consider X's 
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system of beliefs which does not distinguish real numbers and integers, and which contains the 
following beliefs: 
1) There are infmit,ely many numbers between two sequential whole numbers. 
2) The numbers ~etween 1 and 5 are 2, 3 and 4. 
3) 1 and 5 are whole numbers.' 
At a given time, X might assert any either one of these beliefs, but taken together they are 
formally inconsistent. If we appeal to the entire system to give belief 2) meaning, it will have 
an ambiguous meaning. But it seems that a system can hold belief 2) unambiguously. To avoid 
this paradox, we must say that we should only use the relevant conceptual roles for meaning 
determination. But choosing the relevant roles requires that we already know what the belief 
means. Furthermore, holism cannot account for how any of the terms have in-the-world or 
objective meaning without switching perspectives, which is highly problematic. 
I believe I have made it quite clear from this discussion that strict psychofunctionalism 
cannot provide the sufficient conditions for intentionality and hence intelligence. This just means 
that functioning in intelligent ways does not imply intelligence because functioning can occur 
without any appeal to meaningful entities. This is one of the motivations for the AI camp to 
argue that while functions alone are not sufficient, if the functions are performed using 
meaningful symbols, representations, then this will be sufficient for intelligence. With this I turn 
to an examination of representationality. 
ill. Rqnesentations and Symbols 
We have already seen that performance alone is not sufficient for genuine intelligence. 
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This leads us to the second important aspect of the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis--the 
symbol part. The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis contains the basis for the distinction 
between computationalism ~d functionalism. The distinction lies in the fact that computations 
are functions that involve symbols, and- these symbols are representational. The idea is that we 
can avoid the as-if functional ascriptions we've already seen if we add the condition that the 
functions must be carried out over meaningful symbols. The symbolic AI theorist thus argues 
for the Information Processing Theory of intelligence that holds that the symbols processed 
qualify as information about the world, and thus intelligence is nothing more than information 
processing. But accounting for the representational or informational character of computational 
symbols does not turn out to be as simple as the computationalists would hope. If the 
computationalists want representations to explain intelligence, they are fIrst going to need an 
account of how to determine what computational symbols represent in a way that can explain 
intelligence. I argue that a computational approach cannot succeed in providing a useful account 
of the representational character of a symbol or computational state. 
Before I begin, there is a distinction that needs to be drawn. Discussions about mental 
representation usually involve mentioning or implying one of two opposing views, internalism 
or externalism. These concepts are well expressed by Goschke and Koppelberg (1991): 
...we will now consider the two main philosophical research programs for a naturalized 
theory of semantic content. Both approaches characterize representations relationally, but 
they differ on the question of what kinds of relations are to be taken into account. The 
basic idea of the fIrst research program, known as externalism, is to explicate 
representations in terms ofa lawlike dependency relation between a representing event and 
the external event it represents. Within this approach we fInd the different versions of 
correlational theories. The basic idea of the second research program, often called 
internalism, is to explicate representation in terms of dynamic relations between events 
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internal to a representing system. This approach subsumes many different versions of 
conceptual role or functional role semantics (Goschke & Koppelberg, 1991, p. 132). 
So there are actually two different routes for the computationalist to take. 11 The symbolic AI 
theorists are generally trying to establish some form of internalism, whereby the physical symbols 
are internally meaningful to the system. The connectionists, on the other hand, are trying to 
establish some form of externalism, whereby the system succeeds in representing external 
phenomena. Before I address the symbolic and connectionist approaches to representation, I will 
frrst investigate the potential of these more general programs. 
The symbolic internalist approach has long been under fire. 10hn Haugeland (1981a) 
provides a good summary of the general objection: 
The idea is that a semantic engine's12 tokens only have meaning because we give it to 
them; their intentionality, like that of smoke symbols and writing, is essentially borrowed, 
hence derivative. To put it bluntly: computers themselves don't mean anything by their 
tokens (any more than books do)--they only mean what we say they do. Genuine 
understanc!ing on the other hand, is intentional "in its own right" and not derivatively from 
something else (Haugeland, 1981a, p. 32-33). 
The argument that computers don't understand the symbols they process has had wide appeal and 
the most famous argument in this vein is 10hn Searle's (1980) Chinese Room example. This is 
111 take it that the computational approach is seeking extrinsic, relational characterizations 
rather than intrinsic characterizations. It is important to note that I follow Goschke and 
Koppelberg in using "internal" and "external" to distinguish two kinds of extrinsic content. I 
have never seen a computationalist attempt to characterize content intrinsically. Accordingly, 
when I talk about symbols or tokens, I mean for these to be intrinsically ttempty." 
12Semantic engines are defined by Daniel Dennett (1981) as automatic formal systems which 
process over semantically meaningful tokens. This is the same as an information processing 
system. 
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the classic story of a man locked in a room with a list of English commands for manipulating 
Chinese characters. He succeeds in answering questions in Chinese, but only by following the 
English rules. He does no~ himself understand Chinese, nor does his rule-following qualify as 
giving him an understanding of Chinese. The strongest and most popular (internalist) proposal 
for getting around the Chinese Room problem is to argue that if the man were given the complete 
rules of the Chinese language, then he would thereby understand Chinese. This amounts to 
saying that the symbol's meaning is a matter of the system on the whole; the man doesn't 
understand Chinese because he doesn't have the rules for Chinese, just a small set of specialized 
cases. 
The notion that we can make symbols meaningful by appealing to an individual symbol's 
relationships to other symbols in the system is held by various versions of holistic or conceptual 
role semantics. Conceptual role semantics holds that the semantic content of a representation is 
determined and exhausted by the relations it bears to other representations in the system. As 
Laurence Bonjour (1991) puts it: 
Thus, although the individual representations... , taken apart from their actual functioning 
in the person's cognitive processes, could have meant many things other than what they 
actually mean, the claim is that when these representations are taken together in the 
context of the overall inferential pattern, they can each have only the specific content that 
they actually have (Bonjour, 1991, p. 341). 
The problem with conceptual roles in accounting for representational content is that the only 
property available to internal representations is their relational patterns. Bonjour goes on to 
argue that even if the relational pattern that bears upon an individual symbol were sufficient to 
uniquely distinguish it from the other symbols in the system, the pattern will not be sufficient to 
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make the symbol meaningful. Basically, the pattern does not itself constitute meaning for we, 
at least, do not understand our thoughts in this way: 
.. .it is at least clear that my awareness of what I am thinking is not an explicit awareness 
of the inferential/causal pattern as such, as shown by the fact that I would find it very hard 
in any particular case to say what that pattern is (Bonjour, 1991, p. 344). 
Insofar as thoughts are meaningful or representational to the system itself, they are not merely 
extrinsically representational. Thoughts are not understood in terms of their relations; they are 
understood in themselves--intrinsically. I find this to be devastating for any internalist account 
of symbolic meaning. 
The other approach, externalism, seeks to relate the symbols to external phenomena as 
a means to impart them with representationality. Robert Cummins (1989) provides what I have 
found to be the most thorough and straightforward presentation of the various externalist accounts 
of mental representation. All externalist accounts of how computational states or symbols achieve 
a representational content ultimately come down to a version of covariance13 theory (Cummins, 
1989). The idea here is quite simple: a mental state or token represents that which regularly 
causes it. Thus, my being presented with frog stimuli will cause me to create "frog" 
representations. The problem for all theories of covariance is to explain misrepresentations. 
What happens if a toad causes me to have a "frog" representation? It does not matter how clever 
our causal story about how toads can imitate frogs to our intelligent system gets, the issue is 
what "frog" actually represents in that system. 
13Also called correlational theories. 
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The "frog" representation, whether it is instantiated as a binary numeral, a linguistic token 
or a pattern of activation, has no intrinsic or a priori content. This is just to say that all tokens 
are equal; we could call telephones "phones," "dogs," "xorpts," or "Truman Capotes." Social 
conventions fix the representations of our words, but how are we to fix our mental 
representations (Le. make sure our "frog" thoughts are about frogs and not toads or telephones)? 
A token only achieves the representational status it has by its causal relations. So long as a token 
is representational purely in virtue of its being part of a formal causal system, its representational 
content will be exclusively determined by that system. If the system produces "frog" when 
presented with frogs or toads, then "frog" means Ifrog or toad I. 14 And we could imagine a 
strange enough causal scene in which a telephone caused a "frog" (it was dark and the telephone 
made a croaking noise) and we get "frog" meaning Ifrog or toad or telephone I. 
Cummins points out that all covariance theories have acknowledged this problem and 
" 
attempt to solve it in essentially the same way--idealization (Cummins, 1989). Idealization tells 
us that the token's meaning is fixed by what it represents under ideal or optimal causal 
conditions. So our "frog" won't mean Ifrog or toad or telephone I because telephones will only 
cause "frog" in less than ideal conditions. But as Cummins further points out, there is no way 
to spell out precisely what those conditions are, especially from the intelligent system's position. 
Idealization is ultimately circular: 
We're going to have covariance only when the epistemological conditions are right. Good 
epistemological conditions are ones that are going to get you correct (or at least rational) 
14Por the remaining discussions, I will use quotes for tokenings, absolute value signs for what 
the tokens represent and nothing for the "in-the-world" causes of tokenings. 
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results. Conditions like that are bound to require semantic specification (Cummins, 1989, 
p.55). 
We can't specify ideal conditions until we have fixed the representation (otherwise, what is it are 
the conditions ideal for pr~ucing?) but we can't fix the representation until we've specified ideal 
conditions. Neither Cummins nor I see any way around this problem. 
There have, however, been several attempts to get around the idealization problem, all 
of which Cummins has clearly explained and definitively discredited. Among them I fmd only 
two worth mentioning again. The first of these is Adaptational Role semantics which contends 
that the covariance could be reliably established by evolutionary history. 1& The first obvious 
problem with this approach is that a determination of a token's meaning could require a complete 
evolutionary history of that system, perhaps all the way back to pre-organic history or even the 
Big Bang. The organism itself would never have this sort of access so it is not clear how the 
organism might ooderstand this kind of representation, but we could suppose that this process 
has fIXed the token's meaning objectively. 
The decisive problem turns out to be that adaptational role semantics is inconsistent with 
computationalism due to computationalism's insistence on functional equivalencies. 18 If we 
I&Cummins points out that adaptational role semantics was not designed as an answer to the 
idealization problem per se. His arguments are designed to show that this approach will not work 
for a computationalist inclined to use it in this way. It is thus not an argument against 
adaptational role semantics, just against using it in a computationalist theory. 
18Punctional equivalence requires only the same input/output relations for each system. Thus 
we could instantiate functionally equivalent systems in a digital computer, a Turing machine, a 
biological organism, or using gears and springs. 
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produce a system functionally equivalent to one which has adaptationally determined 
representations, are we going to say that its representations are meaningful or not? Ifwe say that 
they are not meaningful b~ause this system did not evolve correctly, then we have denied 
computationalism in general--it is no longer a token's functional significance or computational 
role which determines its meaning. In order to maintain computationalism one must say that if 
the evolved system is meaningful, any systems functionally equivalent to it are also meaningful. 17 
But if we do this, it seems that we end up ignoring the evolutionary history--if we can make a 
system functionally equivalent to an evolutionarily determined system, why can't we make a 
system for which there is a possible but not actual evolutionary history? If we want to stick to 
computationalism, appeals to evolutionary history aren't going to help us determine 
representation. 
I think it is important to mention connectionism here because it might seem that there is 
a sort of evolutionary process involved in the creation of distributed representations. Supervised 
training in neural networks might produce highly reliable and fault-tolerant distributed 
representations, but the representation is still going to be computational. The connectionist is still 
going to want to say that it is the connections and weights of the network which are responsible 
for creating the proper patterns of activation, and it does not matter how these came to be. The 
correctness of the representation is still a matter of the network making the proper responses to 
17History does not matter to the computationalists as Cummins indicates, ''It is which data 
structures you have, not how you got them, that counts. Without this assumption, AI makes no 
sense at all" (Cummins, 1989, p. 84). 
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the given inputs. Supervised training is a method for getting connection weights which are more 
likely to work; it is not a process for bestowing representational status upon patterns of 
activation. 
Another attempt to get around the Idealization problem is Asymmetrical Dependence. 
Asymmetrical dependence, put forth by Jerry Fodor (1989) in his Psychosemantics, maintains that 
misrepresentations are dependent on correct representations in a way that can account for 
misrepresentation while avoiding the problems previously pointed out. This is most easily 
explained by example. Cummins (1989) describes this as it pertains to shrews causing mouse 
representations, a case ofmisrepresentation that should be explained by asymmetrical dependence: 
The fact that shrews sometimes cause Imouse 1s18 in me depends on the fact that mice 
cause 1mouse 1s in me. On the other hand, the fact that mice cause Imouse 1s in me 
doesn't depend on the fact that shrews sometimes cause Imouse Is in me. Mice look 
mousey to me and that mousey look causes a 1mouse I. But it is only because shrews also 
look mousey to me that shrews cause 1mouse Is. Thus, if mice didn't cause 1mouse Is, 
shrews wouldn't either. But it needn't work the other way; I could learn to distinguish 
shrews from mice, in which case mice would cause Imouse Is even though shrews would 
not (Cummiris, 1989, p. 58). 
The problem for covariance is not just to explain why shrews can sometimes cause mouse 
representations, but how mouse representations can be about mice. This is what covariance is 
ultimately incapable of doing: 
We are told that representation rests on a covariance between representation and 
representandum--between cats and 1cats I, for example. Covariance, in tum, is grounded 
in a mechanism that, under the right conditions, will produce a 1cat 1 from a cat. 
According to the CTC [computational theory ofcognition], the mechanism in question can 
be understood only by appeal to inner representations, for the mechanism in question is 
18Cummins uses the absolute value signs around representations to distinguish them from 
actual instances of an environmental condition. 
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one of inference from stored *knowledge. It follows that in order to understand the 
mechanism that the CTC invokes to explain the covariance between cats and Icat Is we 
must already understand representation and the explanatory role it plays in mental 
mechanisms. And that, by my lights, is enough to undermine the power of the covariance 
theories to help us to understand the nature of representation in the CTC. 
The problem, of course, is that it isn't enough to avoid intentional/semantic 
vocabulary; you must do it in a way that explains what representation is. It becomes 
obvious that just avoiding intentional/semantic vocabulary isn't enough when you see how 
easy it is. The problem, remember, was to say under what conditions cats are sufficient 
for IcatIs, and to do it in naturalistic vocabulary (Cummins, 1989, p. 65). 
In the end, covariance turns out to be trivial. We simply find a case where a cat causes a Icat I, 
and then specify the mechanism that produced it and the situational conditions. This is trivial 
because representationality is just whatever makes something representational, not at all an 
interesting assertion. 
The real problem for computational accounts of mental representation is inherent in our 
very notions of mentality and representation, and was alluded to in the latter quote from 
Cummins. Comp.J.ltationalism (Cummins' CTC) requires that representations derive their content 
exclusively from the"relations they have to other representations or the environment. This means 
one of two things: either the representations result from relations to other representations, or the 
representations result from relations to the environment. Our intuition, and my assumption, is 
that representational content must be internally accessible if it going to help us explain 
intelligence; but neither computational approach to representation will give us this. The first, 
internalist content, gives us individuated relational patterns which are void of genuine content. 
This is rather like having a papyrus of Egyptian hieroglyphics before the Rosetta Stone was 
discovered--it could be a rich, complex, meaningful system or a child's scribblings and the system 
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won't care either way. The second, externalist content, if successful, might establish law­
1 i k e 
relations between internal .events and events in the environment, but these relations will be 
necessarily external and internally inaccessible. This is akin to being given a doll and told it is 
a voodoo doll; we can stick needles in our doll but we can never conceive of the person it is 
supposed to represent, we don't know who it represents, and we can't be sure that it is even is 
a representation of something--that it is really a voodoo doll at all. In each case there might be 
a representational content to the thoughts, but in neither is it accessible to the system nor is it 
significant in determining behavior. Either way the computationalist is left with no 
representations that are useful in explaining the system's or general intelligence. 
So it might seem there is no way to account for representation on a computationalist 
account. This is not really the case; the computationalists are just looking for the wrong kind of 
representation. In ~troducing his own theory of representation Cummins tells us: 
Interpretational Semantics is an account of representation in the CTC, whereas most 
philosophical discussion of mental representation has to do with Intentionality--Le., with 
the contents of thoughts--rather than with the contents of the representations of a 
computational system. . ..The kind of meaning required by the CTC is, I think, not 
Intentional Content anymore than entropy is history (Cummins, 1989, p. 88). 
What the computationalists are trying .to do is define the representational content of a 
computational system such that representational content can be identified with intentional content. 
It is this backdoor approach which has produced so many problems for their accounts of 
representation. 
But for most computations, it doesn't seem that we have any trouble interpreting the 
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symbols involved if we are given a "table of assignments" or a coherent interpretation. The 
problem is that the symbols require interpretation; they do not represent anything intrinsically and 
interpretation ultimately requires an intelligent system. Interpretation is the ascribing of meaning 
to a token, and this cannot be achieved computationally. Essentially, even if we were to build 
a computational "interpreter" for our system, we would need to explain the "interpreter's" 
intelligence which would in turn require another "interpreter". This is a homunculur reductio 
ad absurdum where our homunculus is a computational "interpreter." 
It would certainly be unpalatable to think that there was no representationality, or that 
psychology has nothing to study and AI nothing to model. The consequence of my examination 
and arguments is that the having of functions and symbolic representations is not sufficient 
conditions for intelligence. The upshot of all this is that there is a way to conceive of cognition 
and representation which doesn't have the philosophical problems just presented, and there is 
accordingly a domain of study for cognitive psychology and AI. This is because while 
instantiating functions is not a sufficient condition for intelligence, we can still give a functional 
description of intelligent systems. And so I turn to a discussion of the prospects for psychology 
in light of the arguments thus far given. 
IV, Cognitive Psychology and a Science of the Mind 
I think the previous sections have shown that computationalist psychology does not and 
cannot study beliefs, intentions or thoughts. The objective methods of empirical science are 
simply ill-equipped to explain subjective experience or meaning. So what has computational 
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psychology been studying for so long? To this I would reply that the behaviorists studied 
behavior and the functionalists studied functioning, but neither studied the mind. Behavioral 
studies are perfectly valid research strategies even though behaviorism is incomplete. Similarly, 
functional descriptions can be valid even though functionalism is an incomplete theory of 
intelligence. Behavior and functioning are correct for certain levels of explanation, but they are 
not the fundamental level of explanation for thought--people will always behave and their minds 
will function in certain ways, but neither of these activities necessarily constitute thinking. And 
likewise, the computationalists derive functions and compute with them, but they are not getting 
at the heart of thought. 
The only defensible computational psychology is one that does not try to make any claims 
about thought content or subjective experience. But how can psychologists talk about thinking 
without talking about thoughts? What is required is a psychology of thought processes, not of 
thought contents. F~or calls for as much in his clarification of Methodological Solipsism in a 
footnote to Psychosemantics: 
More precisely, methodological solipsism is a doctrine not about individuation in 
psychology at large but about individuation in aid of the psychology of mental processes. 
Methodological solipsism constrains the ways mental processes can specify their ranges 
and domains: They can't apply differently to mental states just in virtue of the truth or 
falsity of the propositions that the mental states express. And they can't apply differently 
to concepts depending on whether or not the concepts denote (Fodor, 1987, p. 158). 
Fodor is concerned here with drawing a distinction between methodological individualism and 
methodological solipsism. The former is the notion that, "psychological states are individuated 
with respect to their causal powers," while the latter holds that, "psychological states are 
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individuated without respect to their semantic" evaluation" (Fodor, 1987, p. 42). Thus, 
individualism is functionalism par excellence--semantics collapses into syntax and we are 
confronted with covarianc~ again. But methodological solipsism is an empirical claim about 
process, and explicitly avoids making any claims about content. 20 Methodological solipsism, thus 
conceived, is not functionalism but merely objective thought individuation--an objective analysis 
of processes which are essentially subjective in content. 
The conflict that needs to be resolved is between theory and methodology. We know we 
cannot produce a theory of mental content or general intelligence based on causal or functional 
accounts no matter how ingeniously we devise our system. And yet we know that there is an 
objective and observable aspect of thought which can and should be studied by psychology, 
namely thought process. This is just to say that we can always give an as-if intentional account 
of a system. As Haugeland (1981b) puts it: 
If one can systematically explain how an [intentional system] works, without "de­
interpreting" it, it is an information processing system (an IPS). By "without de­
interpreting," I mean explaining its input/output ability in terms of how it would be 
characterized under the intentional interpretation, regardless ofwhatever other descriptions 
might be available for the same input and output behavior (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 258). 
"Fodor uses semantic here to mean such aspects of belief as actual truth or falsity and 
reference, he does not include meaning among these. Fodor argues that meaning can be 
determined via causal significances, but I see no way of doing this which makes meaning 
anything different than syntax. 
20ntis point can be very easy to miss since methodological solipsism as first presented by 
Fodor (1981) is clearly applied to narrow content and intentionality. Even if we accept this later 
distinction, Fodor's larger project in Psychosemantics is to provide a complete account of both 
methodological individualism and solipsism. I think methodological solipsism as now clarified 
could only justifiably be fleshed out to look like Cummins' Interpretational Semantics-­
functionalism with a little "f." 
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This just means that we can give a cognitive description of a system even though there may be 
other equally valid descriptions, such as digital electronic or neurophysiological ones, available. 
What is called for is a ~eOry of representation which can be used by a cognitive psychology 
without overstepping its bounds and becoming a theory of content. 
Cummins, in providing his own account of mental representation, gives us a 
straightforward approach to a coherent psychology. I think it amounts to a complete theory of 
representation for psychology which honors methodological solipsism without carrying the burden 
of intentionality Fodor and Block are so eager to bear. Cummins calls his psychological method 
Interpretational Semantics. It begins by distinguishing cognition from thought. Quite simply: 
Some cognitive systems are not minds (not, at least, as we know minds ostensively), and 
many aspects of mentality are not cognitive. Cognitive science is founded on the 
empirical assumption that cognition (hence the study of cognitive systems) is a natural and 
relatively autonomous domain of inquiry (Cummins, 1989, p. 18-19). 
Accordingly, Cummins' Computational Theory of Cognition (CTC) holds that many of our 
cognitive processes might be describable in computational terms, or specified as functions, but 
these descriptions don't purport to specify the actual contents of any thoughts. 
Cummins' proposal is that an essential aspect of representation is interpretation, and this 
should be admitted by our theory. By distinguishing cognition from thought and intelligence in 
general, we do not have to worry that our semantics could be applied to intelligent and non-
intelligent systems. Unlike as-if intentionality, we are not ascribing intentionality to non-
intelligent systems, just cognitive functions. A system can be said to instantiate a function if its 
inputs and outputs are interpretable as proper for the function. In this way, we can instantiate 
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the addition function: 
To get a physical system to add, you have to get it to satisfy a function interpretable as 
addition. And that means you have to design it so that getting it to represent a pair of 
addends causes it to, represent their sum (Cummins, 1989, p. 90). 
Thus, to say something "instantiates a-function" is merely to say that it can be interpreted as 
having instantiated that function. 21 There are, of course, criteria upon which to judge the validity 
and reasonability of a particular interpretation. Cummins' metaphor· is the Tower Bridge. 
Basically, the Tower Bridge has two spans and two supports. The bottom span is the physical 
system which moves from the first support, the input, to the second support, the output. The top 
span is the interpreted function, which travels from an interpretation of the inputs to an 
interpretation of the outputs. If the function "fits" the system for its inputs and outputs, it is a 
valid interpretation. Whether it is reasonable depends on many factors including the 
environmental context and purposes of the function. 
This approach to psychological description does not differ much from that taken by 
computational psychologists. David Marr (1982) distinguishes three levels of description 
available for describing psychological phenomena. The highest level is the computational theory, 
which is the abstract computational function which governs the process. At the middle level are 
the representations and algorithms. This is the symbolic and logical architecture used to satisfy 
the function. The lowest level is the hardware implementation level, the electronic wires or 
neurons which actually carry out the computation. Cummins' point is simply that when 
21For a thorough discussion of intentional and representational interpretation of function­
instantiating systems see Haugeland (1981b). 
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investigating a process, we can never be certain that we have interpreted the system as having 
the representations which it actually has. There is nothing in the hardware level which 
determines our representati(;mal scheme, it can only constrain our interpretations. It is ultimately 
the computational theory which will determine the representations and algorithms. And since we 
can have multiple, equally plausible theories we cannot verify our representational analysis of a 
process. 
This conservative analysis of representation results in what Cummins calls s-
representation, where the "s" is for simulation. S-representation is representation according to 
an analytic or theoretical scheme; the representation we find depends on what we are looking for. 
An s-representation is in this way relative to the simulation under observation. This is a way of 
including our theory as part of our observation. A consequence of this is that a system which 
simulates or instantiates one function will also simulate many other functions (all those functions 
with an isomorphic range and domain), leaving open the possibility for many interpretations. The 
question is not which interpretations are correct but which are useful or interesting. And since 
we aren't trying to get at the subjective content, it no longer matters that we cannot describe or 
determine subjective content. 
Cummins is quite clear about the limitations of his proposal: 
It seems to follow that the CTC, like mathematical science, will work only for the 
cognition of autonomously law-governed domains. The precondition for success is the 
same in both cases: There must be a well-defined upper span to the Tower Bridge. 
Special science isn't always possible. If cognition is possible where special science is not­
-in the cases of clothing and faces of conspecifics, for example--then the CTC's Tower 
Bridge picture of cognition can't be the whole story. 
If, as seems increasingly likely, the specification problem for cognition should 
prove to be intractable, or to be tractable only in special ways, where will that leave us? 
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I think it will leave us with a kind of biological chauvinism (Block, 1978). Cognition will 
simply be identified ostensively, and hence extrinsically, as what humans do when they 
solve problems, jind their way home, etc (Cummins, 1989, p. 113). 
This means that psychology, is limited to studying cognitive behavior only for certain specifiable 
processes. It may sound strict, but this is where cognitive psychology has proven successful 
anyway. Cognitive psychologists have made great strides in demonstrating how humans 
solve logic puzzles, perform "mental" rotations, decipher written language, and interpret visual 
fields. These domains are easy to specify, the solutions are clear and the mistakes can be clearly 
interpreted. But cognitive psychology cannot become a science of the mind, and it cannot 
describe subjective experience. 
Whether empirical science will ever concern itself with questions of subjective experience 
is another matter, for it seems that we could investigate introspective data, or try to document 
subjective experiences. This is indeed what William James did and suggested that others 'do. In 
a paper entitled "Subjective Effects of Nitrous Oxide," James intimates his views towards a 
scientific discovery of subjective experience: 
Some observations of the effects of nitrous-oxide-gas-intoxication..have made me 
understand better than ever before both the strength and the weakness of Hegel's 
philosophy. I strongly urge others to repeat the experiment, which with pure gas is short 
and harmless enough. The effects will of course vary with the individual, just as they 
vary in the same individual from time to time; but it is probable that in the former case, 
as in the latter, a generic resemblance will obtain (James, 1882, p. 186). 
Introspective investigation and personal experimentation may not be the next step empirical 
psychology wishes to take, however, as there is a strong phobia regarding introspective data in 
psychology. And perhaps such investigations are better left to philosophy and literature. 
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y. Connections ys. Symbols 
Having provided the sufficient background to the issues involved, I return now to the 
debate raging between orthodox AI and' connectionism. Goschke and Koppelberg point out that 
this debate rests largely on the debate between externalism and internalism over the nature of 
representation itself (Goschke & Koppelberg, 1991). The orthodox AI approach is one of 
symbolic representation wherein the symbols employed by a system are representational based 
on the relations they bear to other symbols in the system. The symbolic approach is thus an 
internalist approach to mental representation. The connectionist approach is to correlate patterns 
of activation, internal states, to external conditions. It is thus an externalist approach to 
representation. 
The methodologies of each modelling approach should be sufficient to demonstrate their 
presupposed represe,ntational schemes. The representational approach taken in orthodox AI is 
clear from such AI programming languages as LISP and PROLOG. These languages are 
generally used to structure tokens or variables into large hierarchical, relational structures. 
Characteristics are ascribed to tokens, e.g. Idogs I have Ifur I,and tokens are classified according 
to group membership, e.g. Idogs I are Imammals I. The idea is that specifying all of the 
classifications and characteristics of Idogs I will allow the system to give a strict defmition of 
Idog I and the proper control program will allow the system to use this token appropriately. This 
knowledge-base approach in AI is clearly an application of conceptual-role semantics. As this 
approach does in no way depend upon environmental relations for its representational 
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achievements, it is internalist to the core. The connectionists, on the other hand, take a radically 
different approach to representation. They avoid completely explicit rules or facts in the 
architecture of their model~. Rather, they judge the representational character of the internal 
states of the model purely by means of performance. If the model responds correctly to the set 
of stimuli it is given, it is described as having properly encoded the necessary representations for 
its task. In a more obvious manner, a researcher might try to correlate the activity of a particular 
node with the characteristics of the input. In this way, the representationality of a node or the 
activation patterns of the system on the whole is not judged by internal consistency but with 
external correspondence. It is most clearly an applied version of externalism. Thus, the debate 
between connections and symbols is really a debate between. the externalist and internalist 
representational schemes. 
The question of which approach is right or better thus depends upon what we think about 
representation. I have shown in the previous sections how the internalist and externalist 
projects fail, each in their own right, to account for thought or intelligence with respect to 
meaning or content. The result of those arguments was the Interpretational Semantics of 
Cummins. This approach to semantics helps to clarify the debate, but does not solve it. In each 
approach one is applying a representational interpretation to the functions instantiated. The only 
difference between them lies in the functions: for the symbolic theorist the functions and terms 
are explicit and known where for the connectionist the functions are implicit and discovered. 
The consequence of this is that neither approach will give us true Artificial Intelligence. 
What both approaches will give us are models of cognitive processes. The debate between them 
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then is not which is correct, but which gives us the better model. This determination is ultimately 
dependent on what we intend to model. The symbolic approach is more useful if we are testing 
a theoretical cognitive funcpon; we model that function and see if it works. The connectionist 
approach is more valuable if we are looking for the function. We design a system which 
instantiates a process and try to derive the function from its behavior; it is thus valuable in 
isolating processes and functions. 
The larger question for AI in general is how to model general intelligence. While AI and 
connectionism have developed computer models of various cognitive processes that quite often 
perform better than humans, both of these approaches have reached intractable complexity 
problems when extrapolated to real-world situations (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1990). Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus provide an excellent brief history of this AI objective from a philosophical perspective. 
Symbolic AI assumes a world-view in which we can carry out Russell's logical atomism and 
thereby discover the "ultimate context-free, purpose-free elements" of thought (Dreyfus & 
Dreyfus, 1990). This is what Wittgenstein expounded in his Tractus, but finally concluded was 
impossible in his later Philosophical Investigations: 
It is one of the ironies of intellectual history that Wittgenstein' s devastating attack on his 
own Tractus, his Philosophical Investigations, was published in 1953, just as AI took over 
the abstract, atomistic tradition he was attacking. After writing the Tractus, Wittgenstein 
spent years.. .looking in vain for the atomic facts and basic objects his theory required. 
He ended by abandoning his Tractus and all rationalistic philosophy. He argued that the 
analysis of everyday situations into facts and rules (which is where most traditional 
philosophers and AI researchers think theory must begin) is itselfonly meaningful in some 
context and for some purpose. Thus, the elements chosen already reflect the goals and 
purposes for which they are carved out (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1990, p. 320). 
What Wittgenstein' s arguments amount to is a metaphysical conclusion that human thought cannot 
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be specified in mathematically precise enough ways to create a computational model capable of 
instantiating those functions. He foresaw the complexity problem intrinsic to AI and hints at the 
Interpretational Semantics Qf Cummins. 
Connectionism also has its intractable complexity problems. While it is relatively simple 
to model a simple, well defmed process, modelling general intelligence is much more difficult. 
Our intuitions tell us that if we built a large enough neural network and had enough time, we 
could train it to respond appropriately to every possible input. But just as it is impossible to 
write out the rules governing every intelligent behavior for the symbolic theorist, it is impossible 
to create the complete set of inputs that will guarantee the system will produce intelligent 
behaviors. These are not theoretical impossibilities, but practical impossibilities. 22 
Even if an artificial model did succeed in demonstrating general intelligence (e.g. passed 
a Turing test), it would not thereby have achieved intelligence. It would merely have succeeded 
in modelling intelligence, and modelling is indeed a valuable and interesting field of inquiry. I 
think the best conclusion that can be drawn from everything I have said here is that if we really 
want to understand the nature of intelligence, thought, and understanding, we must change our 
approach. Our theories of meaning, content and representation should not be motivated by a 
desire to justify or bolster our scientific paradigms. Rather, what is needed is a theory of mental 
content independently derived and defensible, which scientific theories and models strive to 
satisfy. 
2~e later has also proved computationally impossible. This is just to say that for any given 
neural network, training for general intelligence is NP-complete. See (Judd, 1990). 
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